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Not Without Honor?
Review of CATHLEEN KAVENY, PROPHECY
WITHOUT CONTEMPT: RELIGIOUS
DISCOURSE IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
Andrew Forsyth*
Then Jesus said to them, "Prophets are not without honor, except in their
hometown, and among their own kin, and in their own house" (Mark 6:4).
Hear the word of the LORD, 0 people of Israel;
for the LORD has an indictment against the inhabitants of the land (Hosea
4:1 a).
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, presidential elections prompt Americans to
take stock of the state of the nation, and, in particular, the state of
democracy: the institutions, conventions, and habits, that is, which allow
for representative government, and which-in principal, at least-ground
and ensure equal rights and fair treatment. Countless books will be written
about the 2016 election, no doubt, and whether it was an aberration or the
beginning of a new politics. Among them will be titles that struggle with
the nature of American political speech: After Donald Trump's victory,
can we have coherent debate in the public square or must we now engage
in "post-truth" politics?' And after an election revealing deep-seated
racial, class, gender, and regional differences, even animus, what can our
politicians say to unify the nation or restore trust in American democracy?
Cathleen Kaveny's Prophecy Without Contempt offers a long view of
American political speech.2 Published in early 2016, its analysis begins
* Department of Religious Studies, Yale University. I am grateful to Kevin P. Tobia for his helpful
suggestions.
1. "Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief," "post-truth" is the Oxford Dictionaries
Word of the Year for 2016. Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year 2016 is . ., OXFORD
DICTIONARIES, available at https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/press/news/ 2016/11/17/WOTY-16.
2. CATHLEEN KAVENY, PROPHECY WITHOUT CONTEMPT: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE (Harvard Univ. Press 2016).
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with the Puritans and ends with the 2004 election. Americans speak in the
public square in different ways, she says, but too often we uniformly
understand and judge their political speech as deliberative discourse. We
too readily assume, that is, that participants in the public square exchange
reasons-working from stated premises to conclusions-when, in fact,
they also speak to condemn or disrupt. And that too is political speech.
Kaveny shows that such prophetic discourse, indeed, has a long history in
American politics, and is not-as we might be tempted to suspect-
merely deliberative discourse gone wrong.
Kaveny's book spans over three-hundred and seventy years. It would be
churlish, were it not for the 2016 election, to complain that it does not treat
the last twelve years. As it is, this gap is either a profound liability-
although Kaveny never suggests that her analysis exhausts all political
speech-or a surprising boon: giving us a touchstone against which to
judge this peculiar moment. After reading Prophecy Without Contempt,
we can ask, for instance: if, how, when, and why Bernie Sanders and
Donald Trump, or their supporters, spoke prophetically. Making sense of
prophetic discourse, then, adds a new richness to our analysis of American
political speech. What Kaveny could not anticipate is that deliberation and
prophecy would not together explain the political speech of the 2016
election. We need to add analysis of a further register of rhetoric. Call this,
perhaps, populist discourse-sometimes nativist, sometimes socialistic-
that works not, as deliberation, through reasons, or, as prophecy, through
values, but instead through appeal to interests.
I. AN INITIAL WORD ON PROPHECY
Prophecy Without Contempt works with a particular understanding of
"prophecy." To be clear: "prophecy," as Kaveny uses the term, is not "the
action of foretelling or predicting the future."' Kaveny's prophets do not
gaze into crystal balls. Instead, they follow in a tradition of political and
religious speech-embraced by the Puritans and modified by their
3. Although Kaveny does turn to the 2008 Jeremiah Wright controversy for an example of how
prophetic rhetoric can be wrongly interpreted. Id. at 359-63. See infra p. 126.
4. Populism is a form of mass politics-of both the left and the right-that claims to represent he
common people against elite interests or "outsiders." To call for an analysis of peculiarly populist
rhetoric is not to suggest that populist movements do not employ deliberative or prophetic discourse.
There is an extensive literature on populism in Europe and South America. Prominent recent work that
treats contemporary populism as a trans-national phenomenon or the specific experience of the United
States, includes: ALAIN BADIOU, PIERRE BOURDIEU, JUDITH BUTLER, GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN,
SADRI KHIARI, & JACQUES RANCItRE, WHAT IS A PEOPLE? (2016); LAURA GRATTAN, POPULISM'S
POWER: RADICAL GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2016); JOHN JUDIS, THE POPULIST
EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS
(2016); BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM: PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND
REPRESENTATION (2016); and JAN-WERNER MOLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016).
5. This is the second definition of "prophecy" in THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed.
2007). From the opening pages, Kaveny introduces and uses the concept of prophecy-as-indictment.
But an explicit rejection of the relevance of prophecy-as-prediction comes only, in passing, at 142-43,
and explicitly, at 244-48.
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successors-that is modeled on the social indictments of the prophets of
the Hebrew Bible, the Christian Old Testament. The paradigmatic form of
this prophecy is the jeremiad, named for the genre's gloomiest
practitioner. In a classic jeremiad, a prophet chastens her own people for a
fundamental violation of the basic social compact. She issues an
indictment. The prophet's speech, accordingly, is forensic, not
deliberative: She states the moral law. She charges that the people's past
behavior violates this law. And she calls-unlike many prosecutors,
perhaps-for repentance and reform.
Kaveny's focus is American practitioners of the discourse of prophetic
indictment. Prophecy Without Contempt is not the story of those who
believed themselves called by God to deliver a particular religious
message. Joseph Smith and Mary Baker Eddy make no appearance.6 Its
concern, instead, is those American political practitioners who step into
the shoes of prophets. These would-be prophets do not claim to speak
directly to, or for, God, but rather from within a tradition of moral
reflection. Accordingly, they choose to speak with prophetic cadences, and
can be judged accordingly.
I suspect many readers will not find Kaveny's definition of prophecy
immediately intuitive. This is not solely because, in our popular culture, at
least, prophecy as prediction is the commonplace meaning.7 Kaveny's
"prophecy" also does not include other ways we tend to speak of political
prophets. It does not include American political figures, for instance, who
believed themselves to be God's instruments. John Brown was one.8 More
disconcertingly, it seems that, on Kaveny's account, "prophetic discourse"
can, in principal, properly characterize multiple opposing views, as long as
certain rhetorical criteria are met.'
Prophets, of course, are inspired by someone or something, and the
subtitle of Prophecy Without Contempt is Religious Discourse in the
Public Square. For much of the book, however, this is too modest.
Religio-political speech is ubiquitous in America. Whether we accept his
approbation or not, Tocqueville was right: American civilization is "the
product ... of two perfectly distinct elements that elsewhere are often at
odds. But in America, these two have been successfully blended, in a way,
and marvelously combined. I mean the spirit of religion and the spirit of
6. Joseph Smith (1805-44) founded the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (or Mormon
Church). Mary Baker Eddy (1821-1910) founded the Church of Christ, Scientist.
7. And not just in "secular" speech. For many Christian groups prophecy is understood primarily
as prediction: the Old Testament is understood as predicting Jesus, and certain books of the Bible
(notably Revelation) predict "the End Times."
8. See TED A. SMITH, WEIRD JOHN BROWN: DIVINE VIOLENCE AND THE LIMITS OF ETHICS
(2015).
9. It seems, then, that false prophets in Kaveny's account are those who fail to meet the rhetorical
conventions of the prophetic form (and not, as in our standard speech, those who lack a divine
mandate or spout the wrong message).
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liberty."o
With Kaveny's "prophecy" thus understood as social indictment, we can
turn to the substance of her recasting of the history and nature of
American political speech. In what follows: Part I considers Prophecy
Without Contempt's refutation of current explanations of the state of
public discourse (15-121). These fail to explain non-deliberative political
speech, says Kaveny, and they thereby exclude or pervert core examples
of American political speech, from the abolitionists to Martin Luther King,
Jr. Part II considers Kaveny's treatment of the core example of such non-
deliberative political speech, the jeremiad, and its shifting rhetorical form
(125-235). Condemning their hearers for failing to adhere to agreed
community standards, Puritan jeremiads fostered societal unity. However,
through the Revolution, Civil War, and beyond, jeremiads were
increasingly invoked to demand social change. For good and ill, they
wrought contention. Part III considers the differing rhetorical distinctions
Kaveny attributes to prophetic and deliberative discourse (239-316). Their
differing argumentative conventions explain, she argues, why adherents of
the same religious and moral traditions can sharply differ over political
issues. Part IV considers Kaveny's suggested ethic for prophetic discourse
(319-427). We can look to American and international law, she argues, for
inspiration for procedural and substantive restraints to prophetic speech.
And the source biblical texts of the jeremiad suggest rhetorical constraints.
However, to be effective today, prophecy needs suitably ironized, says
Kaveny. The ever-increasing pluralism of American discourse explodes
open, scrutinizes, and revises prophetic indictments, even as would-be
prophets' core commitments remain.
Prophecy Without Contempt convincingly makes the case that American
political speech includes prophetic indictment. Historically and
conceptually its inclusion renders accounts of political speech more
convincing. It seems to me that Kaveny can make her case because-
unlike many of her interlocutors-she excludes no arguments or examples
ex-ante. She moves freely between descriptive and normative analysis.
Consequently, seemingly arcane religious debates are shown relevant
where they open up general accounts of political speech, and elegantly
wrought theories are dismissed where they fail to capture facts on the
ground. Kaveny's approach opens our eyes to what immediately thereafter
seems so obvious: non-deliberative speech is often robustly political.
II. EXPLAINING THE STATE OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
There are long-standing debates about the state of American public
discourse. And Kaveny turns to three "incomplete explanations" to offer
10. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Eduardo Nolla ed., 2012), 69.
116 [Vol. 29: 1
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol29/iss1/3
Forsyth
her take: those of Alasdair MacIntyre, John Rawls, and Stephen Carter."
All fail to make sense of non-deliberative political speech in Kaveny's
telling. And, for reasons immanent to their own explanations, each cannot
simply condemn and excise non-deliberative speech from what counts as
public discourse.
Complex connections between descriptive and normative judgments
pepper all of Prophecy Without Contempt, not least its engagement of
explanations for the state of public discourse. This complexity stems in
part from Kaveny's refreshing choice to dwell little on her own method.
Like her primary interlocutors-but unlike many who work on religion
and politics from a remove-Kaveny just gets on with making her
argument. She does not offer a prolegomena. She pulls widely and deeply
from differing bodies of scholarship-from technical language studies of
ancient languages to contemporary social science-and undertakes her
own primary research, notably offering up details of Puritan sermons. In
short, she does not stop to ask whether certain sources or bodies of thought
are "legitimate" to consider. Throughout, Kaveny moves fluently between
history and ethics, offering detailed examples-particularly from recent
Roman Catholic debates-that enrich and complicate standard narratives
of religious participation in public life. The result is both description and
critique. Kaveny inhabits a productive (if sometimes uneasy) middle
where, for instance, idealizations of political speech are to be rejected-
"[t]he public square is not a seminar"1 2-but criteria for better non-ideal
political speech can be given.
The first "incomplete explanation" is Alasdair MacIntyre's. He has
influentially argued that the shrillness of our contemporary debates stems
from our lack of a common framework for moral reasoning.13 Our political
speech today is mere emotivism: the expression of preferences rather than
reasons that might convince others. Thus our public debate seems
intractable and even manipulative, as our so-called persuasion is, in fact,
merely the coopting of others into our own chosen projects.
But Maclntyre's constructive response-a new traditionalisml4-does
not give us what he thinks it does. Maclntyre concludes that meaningful
debate is only possible within thick communities engaged in a tradition of
11. KAVENY, supra note 2, at 13.
12. Id. at 419.
13. We do not share a coherent account of human nature as it is, human nature as it ought to be,
and how to move from "is" to "ought," says Maclntyre. We therefore find ourselves stuck between an
individualism based on rights, and bureaucratic organization based on utility. See ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (3d ed., 2007). Kaveny also engages:
Alasdair Maclntyre, Intractable Moral Disagreements, in INTRACTABLE DISPUTES ABOUT THE
NATURAL LAW: ALASDAIR MACINTYRE AND HIS CRITICS 1-52 (Lawrence Cunningham, ed. 2009);
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
THREE RIVALS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION (1990); and
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES
(1999).
14. See JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 118-39 (2004).
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moral argument, where individuals inhabit well-recognized social roles
and share views about the nature of human life, flourishing, and practical
rationality. Kaveny responds that even within communities held together
by a particular tradition of moral reflection-her example is Roman
Catholicism-there nonetheless remain significant foundational
disagreements. Shrill debate continues.
In short, MacIntyre does not provide a satisfactory account of why
committed Catholics can fundamentally disagree on issues ranging from
homosexuality to the use of torture." Kaveny concludes that the shrillness
of public debate, then, is not frustrated deliberation-proffered reasons-
but, instead, a mark of prophetic indictment. Would-be prophets simply do
not invite others to debate, even their co-religionists. They accuse them.
They assume that everyone knows the problem, or should. Their speech is
an indictment of perceived wrongdoing, an ad hominem accusation
expressing their moral outrage and betrayal.
John Rawls's famous account of "public reason" likewise fails the
empirical test.16 Rawls sought to specify the conditions for peaceful and
productive conversation in liberal democracy.17 To further civic peace and
respect, he said, when we debate matters of basic justice and constitutional
essentials we must only articulate reasons that all free and equal citizens
might reasonably accept. But whatever the normative merit of public
reason," in practice, Kaveny suggests, its strictures shift terminology,
rather than change minds. We all suffer as a result. It is frustrating to
debate those who do not, and cannot, give their real reasons for acting, and
it is an experience of deep civic disrespect to have one's fundamental
convictions putatively excluded from public debate.
Kaveny takes the examples of abortion and same-sex marriage and
suggests instead that the public square is enhanced not by the exclusions
brought by public reason but by the hard work of explaining one's point of
view. We need to actually convince our neighbors, rather than worry about
which reasons should convince them.19 We more fruitfully address citizens
15. Catholics, indeed, are a particularly damning example because, more than other traditions,
Catholicism possesses an official leadership hierarchy and a body of authoritative teachings.
16. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 435-90
(expanded ed., 2005).
17. Rawls did not, of course, suggest legal restrictions to political speech, but rather moral and
political standards to which we can hold each other to account.
18. There is a vast literature. Among the more important books are: ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS
WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN
POLITICAL DEBATE (1997); CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS
(2002); JOHN FINNIS, Public Reason and Moral Debate, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN FINNIS:
REASON AND ACTION 256-76 (2012); GERALD F. GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON: A THEORY
OF FREEDOM AND MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND BOUNDED WORLD (2011); KENT GREENAWALT,
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); MICHAEL PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS
FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003); STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR
DISCOURSE (2010); PAUL J. WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM? ON JOHN RAWLS'S POLITICAL
TURN (2010); and PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (2002).
19. This is apt description of Kaveny's own argumentative approach.
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as persons-moved by different reasons and rhetoric-and not, as Rawls
insists, citizens as citizens.
There are times, nonetheless, when political speech does not proffer
reasons at all, Rawlsian or otherwise. Public speech, instead, is the
proclamation of a truth, or the condemnation of perceived wrongdoing:
speakers call down God's judgment (or a secular analogue, like nature).
Such proclamations and condemnations are an undoubted fact or
American political debate. Indeed, they often serve as models of
engagement. To be congruent with this history, in his later writing Rawls
sought to include the speeches of Martin Luther King within his account
of public reason.20 Kaveny insists, however, that MLK's words are not so
easily assimilated. He consistently made appeals to controversial sources,
such as divine law revealed in Scripture, or specific accounts of human
nature.
A final explanation of the state of public discourse proposes civility as
the necessary bedrock for public debate. Stephen Carter's argument. is
exemplary.2 This explanation fails too, for Kaveny. For while we can
readily identify incivility-demonization, a refusal to engage, a lack of
acknowledgement hat the speaker might be wrong-it is much harder to
suggest what is truly civil. True, moral and religious arguments suggest
some answers. Carter, for instance, sees civility as the way to treat fellow
citizens with respect.22 Civility, however, requires self-sacrifice and self-
restraint, for its immediate benefits to us are far from obvious. In Carter's
case, such self-sacrifice and self-restraint are justified and supported by a
theological anthropology. He employs the traditional language of Imago
Dei: human beings are created in God's image, and thus have dignity and
equality in God's sight.2 3 Civility so construed requires a dual
compartmentalization. It both separates the form of the message from its
content, and the message from the messenger. It presupposes that political
messages can be given in civil (non-offensive) ways.
Building off the work of John Murray Caddihy,24 however, Kaveny
finds compartmentalization unsatisfying and unfair. It seems civility is not
a neutral concept, but a kind of American civil religion born of protestant
20. Rawls suggested that in times of emergency, or where speech will later be backed by public
reason, speakers can acceptably make arguments reliant on their comprehensive doctrines despite the
strictures of public reason. John Rawls, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, in POLITICAL
LIBERALISM supra note 16.
21. STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY
(1998).
22. It is the civic extension of generosity or trust.
23. Among legal scholars, Jeremy Waldron also appeals to the Imago. See e.g., JEREMY
wALDRON, What Can Christian Teaching Add to the Debate about Torture?, in TORTURE, TERROR,
AND TRADE-OFFS: PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 261-76 (2010).
24. See JOHN MURRAY CUDDIHY, NO OFFENSE: CIVIL RELIGION AND PROTESTANT TASTE (1978);
JOHN MURRAY CUDDIHY, THE ORDEAL OF CIVILITY: FREUD, MARX, LEVI-STRAUSS, AND THE JEWISH
STRUGGLE WITH MODERNITY (1974).
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denominationalism.25 To maintain space for civility, America separates the
private and the public, the church and the state. Historically this has been
easiest for Calvinists, and their secular successors, who can see self-
sacrifice and self-restraint as a form of civic agape (self-giving neighbor
love). It was more difficult for Lutheran, Catholic, and Jewish immigrants,
however, who viewed life more holistically. To assimilate, to be
recognized as Americans, they had to abandon significant aspects of their
religious identity in the name of (elite protestant) civility. 26
Implicit in Kaveny's argument is that any explanation of political
speech must capture what we commonly take to be core examples. If
Rawls could not adequately account for MLK; Carter, it seems, struggles
with the abolitionists. He can explain their top-level motivations- many
were motivated by religious conviction27-but he fails to deal with the
specifics of their language. The abolitionists condemned their opponents
in the most uncivil ways: "inexorable and remorseless tyrants," cried
William Lloyd Garrison, their "hands dripping in blood."28 And this
uncivil condemnation, says Kaveny, was not a failure of deliberation, but
an embrace of prophetic indictment. We do not yet know the extent to
which the speeches, or tweets, of President Trump will be recognized as
''core examples" of American political speech.
III. THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD
A proper explanation of American political speech needs to account for
its characteristic rhetorical forms. American political speech without MLK
or the abolitionists is not American political speech. A central claim of
Prophecy Without Contempt is that we can better understand and critique
contemporary American political speech by examining the evolving
rhetorical form of the jeremiad, from its appearance in Puritan sermons
through the Revolution and the Civil War to the civil rights movement.
Kaveny's argument is most persuasive when she draws typological
connections between the past and present, Puritans and contemporary
culture warriors. She does not attempt a full genealogy, however, and we
are left wondering, perhaps, to what extent today's would-be prophets
truly draw from the sources, despite the evident comparisons to be made.
The jeremiad is a complaint. It is an indictment in form: "a law-like
charge that certain actions, already performed, violate a socially binding
25. There are many studies of civility as an ideal, and its socially conditioned content. See e.g.
CIVILITY, LEGALITY, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Austin Sarat, ed. 2014).
26. If they are to climb the social ladder: evangelicals have to give up proselytizing Jews; Jews
must adopt "Judaism" as a religion (as one among others) and thus give up on being the chosen
people; and Catholics must drop an ideal of a fusion of church and state.
27. Proponents of slavery also appealed to Scripture and theological tradition. See MARK NOLL,
THE CIVIL WAR AS A THEOLOGICAL CRISIS (2006).
28. Quoted in KAVENY, supra note 2, at 83 and 79.
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agreement."2 9 In Puritan New England, its use depended on a deep sense
of a covenant-a solemn agreement-between the colonists and God, and
thus, while it offered severe critique, it functioned to foster social unity.
Stripped of this covenantal context, however, the jeremiad became
contentious, even destructive. As years progressed, its backward-looking
glance to agreed community standards dissolved into calls for social
change. Its "root genre, which is that of a legal indictment or complaint,"
rhetorically faltered as would-be Jeremiahs purportedly indicted hearers
for laws they did not know and would not have accepted.30
The Puritan worldview included the developing common law of
contracts, of which covenants formed one special type.3 1 As with any
contract, covenants allow for negotiated voluntary agreements, potentially
between vastly unequal parties, which can be relied upon and enforced. In
Puritan thought, a covenant could even allow the unknowable and
omnipotent God to enter into a relationship with humanity. The idea of the
covenant could both maintain God's absolute sovereignty and God's
essential unknowability-bedrock principles of their Calvinist theology-
while providing an account for how this unknowable sovereign God could
choose to limit himself and make himself known through freely entering a
binding relationship with humanity.
Like ideas of social contract that would follow, the covenant binding
Puritan society embodied the Puritans' collective will. But they thought it
divinely willed too. Deeply identifying with the ancient Israel they found
in their Scriptures, the Puritans understood themselves to have a national
covenant with God. This provided the context for their interwoven church
and state. And unlike their salvation, which they believed entirely in
God's hands, they thought their virtues and vices had a real effect on the
product of their bargain. "God would precisely correlate the temporal
prosperity of the new land to the degree to which its inhabitants kept His
commandments."32
In the Puritan imagination the jeremiad was a "stylized complaint for
breach of covenant."33 The indictment of a jeremiad, then, contained
nothing surprising. It assumed that its hearers had freely entered into a
covenantal bargain, and that the behavior condemned was
straightforwardly objectionable. ("Who could defend decay in godliness,
sinful pride, or Sabbath-breaking?")34 It therefore called for accountability
and punishment. While we might balk at their scolding tone and ominous
29. Id. at 126.
30. Id. at 127.
31. Kaveny explains that in the colloquial use of the time "contract" and "covenant" were used
interchangeably. "Covenant," then, does not mean solely the form of action in common law that shares
its name. Id. at 167.
32. Id. at 146.
33. Id. at 170.
34. Id. at 179.
1212017]
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threats, jeremiads reassured the Puritans that God had indeed entered into
an agreement with New England: Jeremiads nurtured hope about the
prosperity that would surely come with virtuous living. They encouraged
their hearers to work harder to fulfill the terms of the covenant, yet
expiated guilt for failure. And they reinforced social consensus through
the ritual of collective self-denunciation.
Beginning as a source of communal unity, through the Revolution, Civil
War, abolition, and beyond, the jeremiad developed into a source of
division. It did so, Kaveny argues, because it lost a "tight hermeneutical
connection" to the idea of a national covenant." Jeremiads increasing
appealed instead to the vaguer, more contestable language of natural rights
and common sense. The wronged party to the agreement was less
frequently portrayed as God, and more frequently the speaker. And the
logic of the covenant shifted from a return to common values to a demand
for social change. The abolitionists, for instance, knew the divisiveness of
their interpretation of the nation's core values. The Constitution, after all,
recognized and condoned slave holding. The abolitionists offered
prophetic indictments for breaching a contract its hearers did not make.
Today, perhaps, we need not try too hard to hear resonances of such
division in the complaints of populist critics, who, against the changes
wrought by unaccountable elites, want to "interpret the Constitution the
way the founders wanted it interpreted," and have the "Constitution the
way it was meant to be."36
IV. THE RHETORIC OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Prophetic discourse is effective when the primary mode of our political
speech is deliberative, says Kaveny. If prophetic language is too common,
it loses its power to convince or cajole. Prophetic discourse, accordingly,
should be rare: a clarion call in moral crisis; a radical ("to the roots")
challenge to shake up entrenched habits of apathy and injustice.
Deliberative discourse, on the other hand, is rightly our default political
speech, says Kaveny. In America, deliberative discourse tends to work
with a "messy virtue theory."37 Whether judging policies or personalities,
Americans freely invoke concepts from across differing political, moral,
and religious traditions: both consequences and duties, for example, but
also rights and rules, personal and national character. 38
35. Id. at 184. Not that this idea of covenant was sustainable. Later generations of Puritans
worried that the connection between their actions and God's actions were unclear. The covenant
partners changed too, as God, to many, became more Deist, and the human parties more varied and
various.
36. Donald Trump made these remarks at the third presidential debate on October 19, 2016.
37. KAVENY, supra note 2, at 252.
38. Kaveny's preferred norms are Thomistic and Aristotelian: we judge an act, she says, based on
its immediate object, its larger purpose or motive, and the broader circumstances within which is takes
place. Deliberation, on this account, is a form of practical reasoning, for which its practitioners need
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Prophecy and deliberation, then, have different functions and focuses.
Prophetic discourse: focuses on an issue, seeks whole-cloth change,
assumes simplicity and clarity, believes political actors must be virtuous,
and treats the present moment as critical for action. Deliberative discourse:
focuses on a range of issues, seeks change through incremental steps,
assumes complexity (a need for nuance and exceptions), believes political
actors possess virtues and vices, and treats the particular moment within a
longer-term trajectory. Accordingly, even if participants share common
moral and religious values, when some choose to speak prophetically and
others deliberatively, the result is more heat than light.
The 2004 presidential election-a high point of the "culture wars"-
provides Kaveny with case studies of the outworking of these rhetorical
distinctions. Debates on abortion and torture divided religious believers,
even those American Christians who share a belief that abortion likely
involves taking human life, and that torture inflicts unbearable pain on a
fellow human being. The abortion debate is more familiar. What Kaveny
adds, however, is a convincing explanation of how-by adopting the
deliberative mode-the most conservative Catholic can, on the most
traditional grounds, vote for a pro-choice political candidate.3 9 (A position
that is widely rejected, even condemned, in most Catholic prophetic
discourse.) To do so, Kaveny turns to the developed casuistry of Catholic
moral theology, and its category of "cooperation with evil" (akin to
"complicity" in the law). It is permissible for a traditional Catholic to vote
for a pro-choice candidate when she does not seek to promote abortion by
her vote, and when it is justified by proportionate reasons. For instance:
she might assess that the pro-choice candidate better possesses the
requisite virtues for public office; and that, given the realities on the
ground (the legality of abortion, for one), the causes of abortion, and the
proposed policies of the candidates, electing the pro-choice candidate will
likely reduce the number of abortions.
Torture was a new issue for 2004. And Kaveny suggests that many
American Christians did not apply the same style of discourse to debating
torture as they did to abortion. Would-be prophets on torture decried it as a
violation of the absolute dignity of human beings created in God's
image,40 and indicted the nation as betraying its bedrock moral principles.
Deliberators saw "torture"-if it did occur-as anomalous, as a breach of
rules. They sought detailed distinctions as to the type of combatant
involved, and, indeed, on what truly counts as torture.
The so-called "Torture Memos"-from John Yoo and Jay Bybee of the
virtues. To deliberate properly, we need: euboulia, a disposition to take good counsel and find out the
facts; synesis, a disposition to see situations as they are; and gnome, a disposition to properly identify
exceptions, and what is justified by them. KAVENY, supra note 2, at 309-10.
39. See CATHLEEN KAVENY, Voting and Faithful Citizenship, in LAW'S VIRTUES: FOSTERING
AUTONOMY AND SOLIDARITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 189-218 (2012).
40. See WALDRON, supra note 23, at 270.
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Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto Gonzales, the Attorney General-are
Kaveny's most effective example of the intentional misuse of rhetoric.41
The Torture Memos used deliberative rhetoric to reduce legal strictures
that protected captured Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters. The analysis
offered by the memos, however, is "not an exercise of moral discernment
in the cause of practical reasoning; rather, it is the deployment of a
powerful set of analytical tools to eliminate what it views as a potential
impediment to a morally and politically imperative course of action."4 2
The Torture Memos are rhetorically disingenuous. They damage
American political speech because they wrongly coopt deliberative
language when a course of action was already decided. They mislead the
people, in other words, by breaking faith with the rhetorical conventions
of public speech.
Prophetic indictment is apposite when arguments are made for torture.43
Prophetic indictment functions as moral chemotherapy: brutal but
sometimes necessary medicine where a perverse growth threatens to
corrupt practical reasoning." Prophetic speech seeks to destroy diseased
moral reasoning and promote the regrowth of virtuous practical reasoning.
If the rise of "fact checking" over the last decade, and notably through the
2016 election season, is a deliberative curb on particular abuses,45 the form
of its prophetic counterpart-a challenge to the wholesale
misidentification of opinion for fact-is as yet unclear.
V. AN ETHIC OF PROPHETIC RHETORIC?
Prophetic discourse, then, has a legitimate if limited role in public
debate, and Kaveny gamely offers procedural, substantive, and rhetorical
criteria for its appropriate use. For these criteria, she turns in part to
American law. This is a novel approach. Moralists, of course, may
41. For the primary sources, see: THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen
Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005). Kaveny explains that deliberative types can misuse prophecy
by placing it on a pedestal-where it speaks only to an ideal world or offers vague moral
admonitions--or can wrongly turn to prophecy when deliberative arguments are proving hard to make.
Likewise, would-be prophets can misuse deliberation by making it instrumental to their own prophetic
ends, dismissing all deliberation as malign rationalization, or subverting deliberation's tools to make it
practically useless.
42. Id. at 298.
43. On the campaign trail, Donald Trump made several remarks in support of the American
government using waterboarding, enhanced interrogation techniques, and techniques "a hell of a lot
worse than waterboarding." (E.g., Team Fix, "Transcript of the New Hampshire GOP debate,
annotated," WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 6, 2016, available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/06/transcript-of-the-feb-6-gop-debate-
annotated.) In remarks to the New York Times, Trump did recount that James Mattis had advised him
that torture is likely ineffective for information gathering. But Trump concluded: "I'm not saying it
changed my mind about torture." "Donald Trump's New York Times Interview: Full Transcript,"
NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 22, available at http://
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/us/politics/trump-new-york-times-interview-transcript.html.
44. Id. at 315-16.
45. See LUCAS GRAVES, DECIDING WHAT'S TRUE: THE RISE OF POLITICAL FACT-CHECKING IN
AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2016).
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illustrate their arguments with legal examples, and theologians and social
critics may judge the law,46 but Kaveny is rare in turning to the law as
itself generative of moral conclusions.47 Prosecutorial ethics, for instance,
is mined for procedural restraints to prophetic indictment.48 While the just
war tradition of international law becomes a source for substantive
restraints: Skillfully adapting its standard criteria of ius ad bellum49 and
ius in bello s0 Kaveny gives us rules for just prophecy in the war of words.
And, indeed, the very form of the jeremiad imposes rhetorical restraints. In
the biblical text, the jeremiad appears either as an "oracle against Israel"
or an "oracle against the nations."5 1 It is the former, says Kaveny, that
provides the better model for American political speech. Would-be
prophets should follow their Hebrew forebears who sorrowfully castigated
their own people not to seek their destruction, but rather, within a context
of divine mercy, their repentance and reform. Too often, however,
contemporary would-be prophets issue "oracles against the nations," aping
the Hebrew prophets' condemnation for destruction of an implacable
enemy, a Babylon or Assyria.
Notably, the jeremiad, as oracle against Israel, has historically furnished
African-Americans with a form of religio-political speech that can at once
conderin the sins of America and envision a horizon of hope.52 A
contemporary Jeremiah, President Obama's sometime Chicago pastor
Jeremiah Wright cried "God damn America!" Wright damned America, as
the prophet Jeremiah damned Israel: "God damn America for treating our
citizens as less than human. God damn America for as long as she acts like
she is God and she is supreme.""
Would-be prophets, of course, are rarely honored in their hometowns.
And Wright's words, picked apart by the news media, were treated as
46. More recent is the work of legal scholars who judge the law from a self-professed religious
viewpoint. See, e.g. CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, (Michael W. McConnell, Robert
F. Cochrane, & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001).
47. The law, in this account, incorporates and inculcates a political morality. In her Law's Virtues,
Kaveny suggests that the law teaches the virtues of autonomy and solidarity. KAVENY, supra note 39,
at 15-70.
48. For one, prosecutors-whether legal or moral, speaking to a grand jury or the American
public-should not engage in vendetta: theirs is a task on behalf of the public. Likewise, the prophet is
not a crank. The prophet "maintains a deep social commitment and connection that grounds his or her
call for reform." The good would-be prophet-prosecutor, then, exercises discretion as to which cases to
bring. She weighs the seriousness of the crime, the likelihood of success, and the deterrence value.
And however egregious the crime, she must maintain integrity, for instance by responsibly
maintaining a factual basis to her claims. Lies, hoaxes, and manipulation of the public are ruled out.
KAVENY, supra note 2, at 323.
49. These typically include: just cause, competent authority, comparative justice, right intention,
last resort, probability of success, and proportionality.
50. These typically include: Discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, and
proportionality.
51. KAVENY, supra note 2, at 351-57.
52. See DAVID HOWARD-PITNEY, THE AFRICAN AMERICAN JEREMIAD: APPEALS FOR JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (2005); STEPHEN MARSHALL, THE CITY ON THE HILL FROM BELOW: THE CRISIS OF
PROPHETIC BLACK POLITICS (2011).
53. Quoted in KAVENY, supra note 2, at 360.
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bizarre, even dangerous.54 But the harsh response to Wright, Kaveny
suggests, was the result of rhetorical misinterpretation. The American
media, and the public at large, treated Wright's words as calling for
America's total destruction (an oracle against the nations) rather than
America's reform (an oracle against Israel). I am not so sure. We might
worry, pace Kaveny, that the jeremiad has diminished rhetorical currency.
Outside of particular communities, Americans no longer sufficiently know
biblical forms of speech or their political history to properly recognize and
interpret the genre.
Kaveny is on surer ground with Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream"
speech, surely the gold standard for public prophecy. What more can be
said of such familiar words? Perhaps that the speech's form is
recognizably jeremiadic: it sets out a violation of covenant (breach of the
values of the Declaration of Independence); it illustrates the factual
background through vivid imagery; it offers a "legal" conclusion on the
basis of this breach of fundamental law and its applications to the facts;
and it does all this in response to widespread patterns, with ultimately
hope-filled motives, and within an imagined community of "all God's
children." Again, however, we might worry that, half a century later,
MLK's words mark the apogee of the public use of prophetic speech.
Quoting from the prophets Amos and Isaiah, and pulling from the
rhetorical traditions of the jeremiad, might disqualify "I Have a Dream"
from Rawls's "public reason," but many today can and do read the speech
as expressing values that are, at least, partially extractable from Judeo-
Christian Scripture and the traditions of American political theology.
Kaveny recognizes, of course, that the American tradition of prophetic
indictment is ever-changing: Jeremiads, which first called for conservative
rededication to founding principles, soon called for revolutions of values.
Jeremiads, which once spoke to a self-identified covenant community of
co-religionists, today must speak to a political culture pluralistic in its
religious and moral concerns, and suspicious of claims to absolute truth.
Kaveny's final gambit then is to offer the model of the ironic prophet.
Only humility-chastened prophecy is adequate for today's politics.
"Irony," like "prophecy," needs careful specification, of course, and
Kaveny's is a "rhetorical and analytical tool-not [] a metaphorical or
moral master."" Irony of this type is not wholly deconstructive. It has
moral value. As Jonathan Lear puts it, such irony is the recognition that in
our language radical possibilities can coexist with a dominant non-ironic
meaning." In this ironic light, Kaveny re-reads Lincoln's Second
54. E.g., Brian Ross & Rehab El-Buri, "Obama's Pastor: God Damn America, U.S. to Blame for
9/11, ABC NEWS, Mar. 13, 2008, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/DemocraticDebate/story?id=4443788.
55. KAVENY, supra note 2, at 377.
56. See JONATHAN LEAR, A CASE FOR IRONY (2011). In Lear's psychoanalytical account, irony
exposes a gap between who we pretend to be and the life we actually live.
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Inaugural speech and the biblical book of Jonah. Each adds humility to
prophecy. Both sides, Lincoln noted, "read the same Bible, and pray to the
same God." "The Almighty," nonetheless, "has His own purposes."
Lincoln claimed no access to the mind of God. Likewise, the reluctant
prophet Jonah-who fled from his divinely-appointed mission-delivers
words that, despite himself, turn the hearts of a hated enemy. God's plans
are inscrutable. In Kaveny's telling, however, the dominant non-ironic
meanings remain: America need not cast off the idea of prophetic
indictment. Basic commitments against human degradation can survive.
(There is no ironic detachment in Lincoln's call "to care for him who shall
have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan.")57 And even a
self-understanding of an American exceptionalism has a chastened place.
But irony is a practical virtue that explodes open such claims; prophecy is
rightly scrutinized and revised on the basis of other, ironic, possibilities.
Few would characterize the political speech surrounding the 2016
presidential election as exhibiting the best of deliberative discourse. But
were elements honorably prophetic? By giving us a long view, from the
Puritans to the near-present, Prophecy Without Contempt offers new
insights into how to recognize and judge the harsh and often dangerous
words that characterize a continuing strain of American democracy-
whether we like it or not. If 2016 was not an aberration, however, our
analyses of political speech will need further broadening. To deliberative
reasons and, now, prophetic values, we will surely need to add populist
interests. If that is true, we will be well served if the history, forms, and
cadences of populist rhetoric receive the treatment Cathleen Kaveny
affords to prophetic indictment and the American jeremiad.
57. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865) in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, 276 (James Richardson ed., 1897).
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